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Ireland	and	the	EU:	‘Good	Europeans’	with	a	Pro-integrationist	Attitude			
The	Republic	of	Ireland	is	often	regarded	as	one	of	the	most	enthusiastic	supporters	
of	European	integration	since	it’s	accession	to	the	EU	along	with	the	UK	and	Denmark	in	the	
first	wave	of	EU	enlargement	 in	1973.	 Ireland	 is	often	considered	an	EU	member	state	of	
‘good	Europeans’	with	a	pro-integrationist	attitude.	Eurobarometer	data	from	1973	–	2016	
illustrates	this	with	Irish	respondents	showing	consistent	and	positive	support	towards	the	
EU	(See	Figure	1).		
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However,	the	reality	of	 Irish	public	opinion	 is	more	nuanced:	support	 for	the	EU	 in	
Ireland	is	not	a	single	entity	but	a	complex	set	of	opinions	determined	by	a	variety	of	factors.	
Since	the	1990’s	knowledge	about	the	EU	amongst	the	Irish	public	is	low	with	individuals	in	
Ireland	more	 likely	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 economic	 aspects	 of	 the	 EU,	 such	 as	 the	 freedom	 of	
movement,	 the	 Euro	 and	 economic	 prosperity.	 This	 ‘knowledge	 deficit’	 is	 perhaps	
unsurprising	as	for	the	first	twenty	years	of	EU	membership	Ireland’s	self-perception	of	its	
status	within	 the	 EU	was	 that	 of	 a	 small	 peripheral	member	 state.	 Ireland	 became	 a	 net	
beneficiary	of	EU	funding	and	successive	Irish	governments	and	negotiators	prioritized	and	
maximized	 receipts	 of	 EU	 funding	 via	 the	 Common	 Agricultural	 Policy	 (CAP)	 or	 European	
Regional	 Structural	 and	 Development	 Funds	 (ERSDF).	 Ireland	was	 often	 considered	 to	 be	
suffering	from	a	‘sponger	syndrome’	in	viewing	the	EU	as	a	source	of	additional	exchequer	
funding	for	a	poor	EU	member	state	with	Irish	politicians	and	officials	possessing	a	‘begging	
bowl’	 mentality.	 During	 the	 1990’s	 Irish	 government	 and	 Irish	 society	 were	 indeed	 pro-
European	 however	 support	 for	 the	 European	 integration	 process	 itself	 was	 conditional	 –	
Ireland’s	approach	was	to	ask	what	Brussels	could	do	for	the	Irish	economy,	rather	than	what	
the	Irish	economy	could	do	for	Brussels.				
	
	
Ireland	–	a	Staunchly	Pro-European	Member	State?		
The	pro-EU	status	of	 the	 Irish	began	 to	be	challenged	 in	 the	2000s	when	 Ireland’s	
economic	boom	led	the	Irish	government	into	conflict	with	the	EU	over	its	management	of	
the	Irish	economy.	The	Irish	government	was	criticized	for	its	refusal	to	dampen	the	successful	
Celtic	Tiger	economy	and	for	its	substantial	tax	concessions	for	foreign	investors	which	were	
(and	still	are)	regarded	by	the	European	Commission	as	breaking	the	spirit	if	not	law	of	the	
European	Single	Market.	By	the	early	to	mid	2000s,	the	continued	deepening	of	the	processes	
of	 European	 integration	and	 the	 introduction	of	 the	Euro	met	 little	 resistance	and	 in	 fact	
produced	 sources	 of	 identity	 for	 many.	 However,	 individuals	 in	 Ireland	 tend	 to	 focus	 on	
national	or	intergovernmental	aspects	of	EU	membership	and	representation	rather	than	on	
the	 policy-making	 aspects	 of	 EU	 institutions	 which	 produce	 legislation	 that	 has	 an	 effect	
across	all	EU	member	states.	Therefore,	there	remains	a	proportion	of	the	population	who	
oppose	 further	 ‘sharing	of	 sovereignty’	and	are	concerned	about	 the	 impact	and	 Ireland’s	
involvement	in	the	EU	is	having	on	Irish	identity,	values	and	culture.	As	a	consequence,	the	
EU	project	in	Ireland	is	not	one	which	can	be	encapsulated	by	a	single	overarching	judgement	
but	 only	 through	 the	 appreciation	 of	 many	 different	 facets.	 These	 nuances	 and	 the	
multifaceted	nature	of	Irish	public	opinion	towards	the	EU	were	borne	out	in	the	rejection	of	
the	Nice	Treaty	in	May	2001	and	the	Lisbon	Treaty	in	June	2008.			
	
The	Complex	Nature	of	Referendums	as	Forums	of	Debate	on	the	EU		
Between	 1972-2012,	 Irish	 governments	 have	 held	 nine	 European	 referendum	
campaigns	with	two	broad	characteristics	emerging	from	each	campaign.	Firstly,	turnout	in	
EU-related	 referendums	 is	 generally	 lower	 than	 at	 Irish	 general	 elections	with	 the	 lowest	
turnout	 being	 34.79%	 in	 the	 first	 referendum	 on	 the	 Nice	 Treaty	 in	 2001	 (see	 Table	 1).	
Secondly,	EU-related	treaties	(with	the	exception	of	the	Accession	Treaty	in	1973)	have	gained	
broad	support	across	the	political	establishment	including	the	mainstream	political	parties,	
trade	unions	and	business	organizations.	Political	parties	 such	as	Sinn	Fein	and	 the	Green	
Party	 as	 well	 as	 non-party	 political	 and	 civil	 society	 groups	 have	 all	 opposed	 EU-related	
referendums.	Up	until	 the	 first	 referendum	on	the	Treaty	of	Nice	 in	2001,	successive	 Irish	
governments	and	pro-European	campaigners	pointed	 to	 the	benefits	EU	membership	had	
brought	to	Ireland	in	terms	of	direct	financial	transfers	and	increased	opportunities	for	Irish	
workers	 and	 Irish	 industry.	 Pro-European	 groups	 and	 political	 parties	 in	 Ireland	 have	
consistently	 relied	 upon	 the	 permissive	 consensus	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 individuals	 in	 Ireland	
appreciated	the	considerable	benefits	Ireland	derived	from	EU	membership	thus	little	effort	
was	made	to	explain	the	issues	at	stake	for	the	Irish	electorate.		
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The	rejection	of	 the	Nice	Treaty	 in	2001	and	Lisbon	Treaty	 in	2008	highlighted	 the	
potential	emergence	of	a	new	popular	scepticism	towards	the	EU	in	so	far	as	it	concerns	Irish	
interests	and	deeper	European	integration	in	Ireland.	The	emergence	of	referendums	as	key	
forums	 for	 debate	 about	 the	 EU	 in	 Ireland	 has	 resulted	 in	 a	 much	 greater	 degree	 of	
polarisation	of	 opinions.	 This	 polarisation	 is	 two-fold.	 Firstly,	 referendums	 tend	 to	 reduce	
complex	issues	to	a	simple	‘Yes’	or	‘No’	answer.	Secondly,	with	nine	EU-related	being	held	
thus	 far	 in	 Ireland	 this	 mechanism	 of	 direct	 democracy	 has	 fuelled	 an	 element	 of	
disenchantment	 among	 the	 Irish	 electorate	 with	 voters	 questioning	 why	 they	 are	
continuously	being	asked	to	vote	on	complex	EU	issues.		
Voting	in	EU	related	referendums	can	be	distinguished	between	‘second	order’	effects	
and	the	impact	of	‘issue	voting’.	The	‘second	order’	effects	approach	infers	that	the	central	
determinant	of	vote	choice	in	EU-related	referendums	is	an	EU	member	states	national	party	
politics	 and	 that	 voters	 often	 use	 referendums	 in	 order	 to	 express	 their	 discontent	 or	
satisfaction	with	the	incumbent	government	as	well	as	determining	their	vote	as	a	result	of	
party	 cues	 with	 people	 voting	 in	 accordance	 with	 their	 political	 party	 affiliation.	 While	
according	 to	 the	 ‘issue	 voting’	 approach,	 voting	 in	 EU	 related	 referendums	 is	 driven	 by	
individuals’	EU-related	concerns	i.e.	people	decide	to	support,	or	not	support,	a	treaty	based	
on	the	merits	of	the	European	project	and	the	specific	elements	that	particular	treaty	poses	
to	them.		
When	the	Irish	electorate	voted	‘No’	to	the	Nice	Treaty	in	May	2001	and	the	Lisbon	
Treaty	 in	 June	 2008	 both	 the	 domestic	 political	 and	 economic	 context	 played	 a	 vital	 role	
highlighting	elements	of	the	 ‘second	order’	and	‘issue	voting’	approaches.	 In	the	first	Nice	
Treaty	 referendum	 three	 key	 issues	 were	 at	 stake:	 sovereignty,	 neutrality	 and	 EU	
enlargement	emphasising	 ‘issue	voting’	by	 the	electorate1.	 In	 the	 first	 referendum	on	 the	
Lisbon	 Treaty	 ‘second-order’	 factors	 can	 be	 cast	 aside	 as	 satisfaction	 with	 the	 Irish	
government	declined	significantly	between	Lisbon	1	and	Lisbon	2.	The	change	in	the	political	
context	 from	the	first	Lisbon	Treaty	referendum	in	June	2008	to	the	second	Lisbon	Treaty	
referendum	 in	October	 2009	was	 a	 result	 of	 the	 Irish	Government’s	 attempts	 to	 address	
concerns	highlighted	by	 the	 ‘No’	 campaign	on	 issues	 in	 relation	 to	military	neutrality,	 the	
corporation	tax	rate,	the	belief	that	abortion	services	would	be	widely	available,	a	weakening	
of	 	workers’	 rights	 and	 a	 reduction	 in	 Irish	 influence	 at	 the	 EU-level	 due	 to	 the	 loss	 of	 a	
permanent	Irish	EU	Commissioner2.	However,	it	was	perhaps	the	change	in	economic	context	
from	Lisbon	1	to	Lisbon	2	which	was	most	dramatic	as	Ireland	plunged	into	recession	after	
the	rejection	of	the	first	referendum	on	the	Lisbon	Treaty.	It	was	frequently	expressed	that	
as	a	result	of	the	onset	of	the	economic	and	financial	crisis	Ireland	was	safer	as	part	of	a	larger	
economic	community	that	could	potentially	offer	Ireland	protection,	which	Ireland	did	receive	
through	a	three-year	Economic	Adjustment	Programme	or	Bailout	in	December	2010	from	
the	 Troika	 (which	 it	 exited	 in	 December	 2013).	 Yet	 despite	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 potential	
popular	scepticism	from	2001-2008	and	the	financial	bailout	received	in	2010,	Irish	attitudes	
towards	the	EU	continued	to	remain	consistently	positive	(see	Figure	1)	with	Eurobarometer	
from	2009	–	2014	demonstrating	that	the	Irish	electorate	maintained	that	the	EU	was	the	
best	placed	institution	to	take	effective	action	against	the	economic	and	financial	crisis	(See	
Figure	2).		
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Ireland	and	Brexit:	a	potential	Irexit?		
Brexit	 however	 represents	 the	 single	 greatest	 political	 and	 economic	 challenge	 to	
Ireland	since	World	War	Two.	Ireland’s	unique	circumstances,	including	the	issue	of	peace	in	
Northern	 Ireland	 and	 the	 preservation	 of	 the	 Good	 Friday	 Agreement	 (GFA),	 must	 be	
addressed	in	Brexit	negotiations.	Firstly,	the	future	trade	relationship	between	the	EU	and	
the	 UK	 will	 be	 crucial	 to	 both	 constituent	 parts	 of	 the	 island	 of	 Ireland.	 Secondly,	 the	
																																																						
1	The	Irish	Government	sought	Declarations	with	the	EU	which	were	added	to	the	Nice	Treaty	at	an	EU	Summit	
in	Seville	in	June	2002	which	provided	protection	for	the	continuation	of	Irish	neutrality		
2	Guarantees	on	these	issues	were	added	as	Protocols	in	the	second	referendum	on	the	Lisbon	Treaty		
relationship,	whether	it	is	the	result	of	EU-UK	relations,	or	a	relationship	specifically	designed	
to	 address	 Ireland’s	 circumstances,	 does	 not	 solely	 depend	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 border	
between	Northern	Ireland	and	the	Republic	of	Ireland,	and	no	border,	whether	it	is	visible	or	
invisible,	can	create	a	satisfactory	result	if	the	economic	arrangements	are	unsound.	Hence,	
why	the	Irish	government	has	advocated	for	the	UK,	or	at	a	minimum	Northern	Ireland,	to	
remain	in	the	European	Single	Market	and	the	Customs	Union.		
This	has	resulted	in	fraught	relations	between	Dublin,	London	and	Belfast	which	came	
to	the	fore	in	December	2017	as	Phase	One	of	Brexit	negotiations	came	to	a	close.	These	talks	
are	officially	between	the	EU	and	the	UK	delegations,	but	an	Irish	delegation	has	formed	part	
of	these	negotiations	as	the	issue	of	the	border	between	the	Republic	of	Ireland	and	Northern	
Ireland	became	all	the	more	pertinent.	These	intense	bilateral	talks	between	British	and	Irish	
officials	on	the	border	question	led	to	a	breakthrough	swapping	a	pledge	for	“no	regulatory	
divergence”	in	the	text	for	a	promise	of	“regulatory	alignment”.	For	Britain,	“alignment”	was	
regarded	as	weaker	than	“no	divergence”,	while	for	the	Republic	of	Ireland,	it	was	understood	
to	mean	that	Britain	had	made	a	promise	that	there	would	be	no	hard	border	–	which	implied	
a	special	status	for	Northern	Ireland.	But	for	Northern	Ireland’s	Democratic	Unionist	Party	
(DUP),	 a	 political	 party	 that	 defends	 the	 Union	 with	 the	 UK	 and	 provides	 the	 current	
Conservative	 Party	 with	 its	 majority	 in	 government	 under	 a	 Confidence	 and	 Supply	
Agreement,	this	is	problematic.	The	DUP	campaigned	for	Brexit	and	has	insisted	that	Northern	
Ireland	will	leave	the	EU	on	the	same	terms	as	the	rest	of	the	UK	in	March	2019.	What	the	
December	impasse	highlighted	was	that	politics	trumps	economics	and	as	a	consequence	this	
has	an	impact	on	a	possible	Irexit	–	or	Irish	exit	of	the	EU	-		debate.			
The	 anticipation	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 Brexit	 on	 the	 Irish	 economy	 has	 learned	 itself	 to	
speculation	 about	 a	 potential	 Irexit.	 The	 question	 of	 Irexit	 has	 developed	 primarily	 as	 an	
economic	argument	implying	that	Ireland	will	be	left	marginalised,	peripheral	and	dependent	
post	Brexit.	This	economic	reasoning	centres	upon	two	issues.		Firstly,	Ireland’s	participation	
in	the	European	Single	Market	 is	vital	 to	the	economy	and	secondly,	 Ireland’s	 interactions	
with	 the	 British	 economy	 are	 heavily	 intertwined.	However,	 there	 are	 three	 fundamental	
economic	and	political	problems	with	the	Irexit	thesis.	Firstly,	from	an	economic	perspective,	
the	 stance	 on	 a	 possible	 Irexit	 omits	 the	 question	 of	 how	 Ireland	 developed	 economic	
independence	and	moved	on	from	political	domination	by	the	UK	when	it	joined	the	EU	in	
1973.	Irish	accession	to	the	EU	enabled	the	diversification	in	trade	and	investment,	including	
the	European	Single	Market,	but	also	attracting	Foreign	Direct	Investment	(FDI)	from	the	USA.	
Secondly,	from	a	political	perspective,	the	equal	partnership	between	the	UK	and	Ireland	as	
EU	member	states	facilitated	negotiations	on	the	issue	of	peace	in	Northern	Ireland	and	in	
particular	the	Good	Friday	Agreement.	Thirdly,	public	opinion	support	for	the	EU	in	Ireland	is	
consistently	positive	and	there	is	little	appetite	among	individuals	in	Ireland	to	leave	the	EU.	
A	 poll	 conducted	 by	 the	 political	 polling	 company	 RED	C	 in	May	 2017	 found	 that	 88%	of	
individuals	 in	 Ireland	believe	that	 Ireland	should	remain	 in	the	EU,	notwithstanding	Brexit.	
This	trend	 is	reiterated	by	Eurobarometer	data	for	2017	with	83%	of	 individuals	 in	 Ireland	
believing	membership	of	the	EU	is	a	good	thing	(see	Figure	1).	Overall,	the	Irexit	debate	is	a	
crude	caricature	of	 Ireland’s	political	 and	economic	 situation	which	 falls	back	on	 inherent	
clichés	(i.e.	Ireland	is	a	small,	peripheral	member	state,	reliance	on	the	UK	etc.),	disregarding	
Ireland’s	success	in	Brexit	negotiations	(i.e.	ensuring	the	UK	cannot	move	forward	to	trade	
negotiations	until	the	unique	Irish	issues	have	been	full	addressed)	and	provides	no	indication	
of	what	 Irexit	 and	 the	 future	 relationship	with	 the	EU	would	 look	 like.	But	perhaps	more	
importantly,	it	demonstrates	a	rudimentary	understanding	of	Irish	attitudes	towards	the	EU.	
An	Irexit	is	highly	questionable.		
	
What	next	for	Ireland?		
While	 an	 Irexit	 is	 unlikely,	 Ireland’s	 relationship	 with	 the	 EU	 will	 not	 be	 without	
difficulties.	Firstly,	in	the	context	of	Brexit	on	issues	such	as	the	economic	impact	Ireland	will	
experience	as	well	as	questions	in	relation	to	the	border	between	Northern	Ireland	and	the	
Republic	 of	 Ireland.	 Secondly,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 future	 relationship	with	 the	 EU	most	
notably	the	Apple	tax	ruling	and	the	subsequent	referral	to	the	European	Court	of	Justice.	
Although	a	knowledge	deficit	continues	to	exists	among	the	public	in	Ireland	the	salience	of	
EU	membership	and	support	for	the	EU	is	consistently	strong	and	shows	little	sign	of	abating.	
Brexit	has	forced	Ireland	to	think	anew	about	its	relationship	with	both	the	UK	and	the	EU	
and	 instead	of	 turning	towards	an	historical	periphery	 Ireland	recognizes	that	present	day	
challenges	are	global	and	do	not	respect	borders.	As	a	consequence,	Ireland	is	best	placed	to	
meet	 these	 challenges	 through	 continued	 cooperation	 and	 engagement	 subsequently	
influencing	 solutions	 as	 part	 of	 the	 EU.	 Brexit	 means	 Brexit	 but	 for	 Ireland	 remaining	 a	
member	state	of	the	EU	is	in	its	national	interest	–	and	public	opinion	recognizes	this.	
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Figure	2:	Effective	action	against	the	economic	&	financial	crisis	2009-2014	
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Table	1:	EU-Related	Referendums	in	Ireland	1973	–	2012	
EU-Related	Treaty		 Date,	Month,	Year		 Result	(incl.	turnout)	
Accession	to	the	European	
Community		
10th	May	1973	
	
Yes	83.09%,		
No	16.91%	
Turnout	70.88%	
	
Treaty	on	Single	European	
Act		
26th	May	1987	 Yes	69.92%	
No	30.08%	
Turnout	44.09%	
	
Treaty	of	European	Union	
(Maastricht)	
11th	June	1992	 Yes	69.05%	
No	30.95%	
Turnout	57.31%	
	
Treaty	of	Amsterdam		 22nd	May	1998	 Yes	61.74%	
No	38.26%	
Turnout	56.20%	
	
Nice	Treaty	1	 7th	June	2001	 Yes	46.13%	
No	53.87%	
Turnout	34.79%	
	
Nice	Treaty	2	 19th	October	2002	 Yes	62.89%	
No	37.11%	
Turnout	49.47%		
	
Lisbon	Treaty	1	 12th	June	2008	 Yes	46.60%	
No	53.40%	
Turnout	53.13%	
	
Lisbon	Treaty	2	 2nd	October	2009	 Yes	67.13%	
No	32.87%	
Turnout	59%	
	
Fiscal	Treaty		 31st	May	2012	 Yes	60.29%	
No	39.71%	
Turnout	50.60%	
Source:	Central	Statistics	Office	(CSO)	Ireland	
	
	
